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Introduction to the Special Issue: Reframing German Federalism 
 
Charlie Jeffery, Niccole Pamphilis, Carolyn Rowe and Ed Turner 
 
 
In recent years, Germany’s federal system has been subject to a number of 
pressures for change. A constitutional debate on ‘disentangling’ the legislative roles 
of federal and Länder institutions which stuttered through the 1990s and into the 
2000s finally led to a re-allocation of competences in 2006. These reforms shifted 
some areas of legislative responsibility from the federal to the Länder level and 
relaxed rules which had earlier justified a federal override when both levels held 
legislative responsibilities concurrently. At the very least, these constitutional 
adjustments increased the potential for policy outputs to diverge from one Land to 
another and give expression to territorial differences in priority and preference.  
 
These changes to constitutional structure have unfolded in challenging political 
circumstances. Starting in 2009, Germany has found itself in a climate of profound 
economic unease, notably in its dealings with the fallout from the 2007 financial crisis 
in conjunction with the Eurozone crisis, and an increased public appetite within 
Germany for fiscal discipline. These circumstances led the 2006 reforms to be 
supplemented in 2009 by further reforms designed to tighten fiscal constraints 
around policy-making in the Länder, as well as at the national level. It is moot as to 
whether the effect of the 2009 reforms is to limit the scope for policy divergence 
created by the 2006 reforms (by removing budgetary scope Länder to pursue 
different patterns of spending) or to increase such scope, with increased fiscal self-
reliance fostering new ideas on how to address public policy challenges.1 
 
Unsurprisingly the 2006 and 2009 reforms have triggered significant interest in their 
effects, in particular whether reform has prompted a growth in policy diversity among 
the Länder. 2 If so the prevailing narrative about the German federal system as one 
geared to producing uniformity of policy outcomes would have been upended. This 
special issue shares that interest – but stands back to explore the question of 
uniformity vs diversity in a different frame. That frame – a ‘challenger’ narrative 
perhaps – sees diversity as a persistent, but under-recognised aspect of the German 
federal system. In that view recent reforms are less a break with tradition and more a 
surfacing and confirmation of some of the underlying features of that system. We 
begin by setting out these alternative narratives before drawing out a set of 
questions from the contrast between them, and then discussing how the 
contributions to the special issue shed light on those questions. 
 
                                                          
1 Heinz, Dominic (2016), ‘Coordination in budget policy after the Second Federal Reform: Beyond Unity and 
Diversity’, in German Politics 25/2 pp. XXX 
2 For instance, Hildebrandt, Achim / Wolf, Frieder (2008, eds.) Die Politik der Bundesländer: Staatstätigkeit im 
Vergleich, (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag); Achim Hildebrandt / Frieder Wolf (2016, eds.),  Politik in den 
Bundesländern: Zwischen Föderalismusreform und Schuldenbremse (Wiesbaden: Springer VS Verlag); Tepe, 
Markus / Pieter Vanhuysse (2013), ‘Cops for Hire? The Political Economy of Police Employment in the German 
States’, Journal of Public Policy 33/2, pp. 165-199; von Blumenthal, Julia (2009) Das Kopftuch in der 
Landesgesetzgebung: Governance im Bundesstaat zwischen Unitarisierung und Föderalisierung (Nomos: Baden 
Baden), Turner, Ed / Rowe, Carolyn (2015), Racing up, down or to the middle?  Consequences of 
decentralisation in Germany (London: Institute for Public Policy Research). 
 
The unitary federal system: Germany’s methodological nationalism 
 
Research on German federalism has traditionally been bound by a powerful 
narrative of uniformity,3 which extends back to early postwar assessments (Wheare 
1953),4 Hesse’s (1962) depiction of a ‘unitary federal state’,5 the twin assessments in 
the mid-1970s by Scharpf6 of entangled policy-making and Lehmbruch7 of the 
integration of party competition across the federal and Länder levels, through to 
Abromeit’s (1992) analysis of post-unification continuities,8 and Scharpf’s (2008) 
more recent reaffirmation of Germany as a ‘federal state with a unitary political 
culture’.9  
 
This narrative focuses on the functional distribution of responsibilities in the German 
federal system, which gives the federal level responsibility for most legislation across 
policy issues in Germany and the Länder responsibility for implementing most of that 
legislation, the consequent close involvement of the Bundesrat in the federal 
legislative process, and a presumption of uniformity of policy standards available to 
all citizens irrespective of location. This view discounts the Länder as significant 
venues for autonomous policy-making, instead focusing on their ‘entanglement’ 
(Verflechtung) in statewide politics at the federal level. It often characterises politics 
in the Länder - not least the way parties compete and voters vote – as a subordinate 
reflection of federal-level politics.  
 
That narrative has a strong normative foundation which reflects a series of nation-
building claims which have taken on different forms in different eras. These claims 
are traceable back to the Bismarckian social welfare reforms, which were targeted 
not just at mitigating class conflict, but also to overcome the particularisms of the 
German states that combined into federation in 1871.10 Those claims were renewed 
after 1949 as a rallying cry of solidarity in postwar reconstruction and the integration 
of refugees and escapees from the east, and again after 1990 as a commitment to 
the integration of east Germans on a basis of equality with west Germans.11 They 
chime with other narratives of modernisation and progress in the social sciences 
                                                          
3 Sturm, Roland (2010): ‘More Courageous than Expected? The 2006 Reform of German Federalism’, in Erk, Jan 
/ Swenden, Wilfried (eds.), New Directions in Federalism Studies (London: Routledge), pp.34-49. 
4 Wheare, Kenneth (1953): Federal Government, 3rd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
5 Hesse, Konrad (1962): Der unitarische Bundesstaat (Karlsruhe: Müller) 
6 Scharpf, Fritz W/ Reissert, Bernd / Schnabel, Fritz (1976): Politikverflechtung. Theorie und Empiriedes 
kooperativen Föderalismus in der Bundesrepublik (Kronberg: Scriptor). 
7 Lehmbruch, Gerhard (1976): Parteienwettbewerb im Bundesstaat (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer). 
8 Abromeit, Heidrun (1992): Der verkappte Einheitsstaat (Opladen: Leske und Budrich) 
9 Scharpf, Fritz W. (2008): ‘Community, Diversity and Autonomy: The Challenges of Reforming German 
Federalism’, in German Politics, Vol. 17 / 4, pp. 509 – 21, here p. 510. 
 
10 Manow, Philip (2005): ‘Germany: Cooperative Federalism and the Overgrazing of the Fiscal Commons“, in: 
Francis G. Castles, Stephan Leibfried and Herbert Obinger (Eds.): Federalism and the Welfare State (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press), pp. 222-262. 
11 Jeffery, Charlie (2009), ‘Territoriale Politik, a-territoriale Wissenschaft und der deutsche Föderalismus 1949 – 
2009‘, in: Europäisches Zentrum für Föderalismus-Forschung (Ed.): Jahrbuch des Föderalismus 2009 (Baden-
Baden: Nomos), pp. 122-36. 
 
which celebrated the achievement of democracy and welfare at the level of the 
nation-state and viewed the persistence of territorial distinctiveness within the state 
with suspicion as a pre-modern relic and/or a threat to equality and welfare across 
the state as a whole.12 As Sturm put it in the German context, ‘regional diversity 
seemed to be something obsolete, which had to be overcome’.13 Recent complaints 
following the 2006 federal reforms about territorial diversity as a recipe for a 
‘confusion of norms’ (‘Normenwirrwarr’)14 or the ‘Balkanisation’ of policy15 suggest 
that this imagery persists, as do controversies about divergent policy frameworks in 
education policy16 or childcare.17 
 
A strongly normative framing of the subject of social science analysis – in this case 
the German federal system – runs the risk of biasing methodological choices. In 
particular it has routinely led to the federal system being taken as a single unit of 
analysis, rather than, for example seeing the federal system as a composite of 
sixteen discrete units of analysis, comprised of the sixteen Länder. That choice of a 
single, system-wide unit of analysis – the ‘unitary’ federal system – lies behind work 
on German federalism of enduring brilliance, like that of Scharpf and colleagues on 
‘entangled’ policy-making and Lehmbruch on a party system integrated across levels 
of government. But it also runs the risk of leaving other aspects of the federal system 
‘hidden from view’.18 To put it in more everyday terms, if you only look in one 
direction, you will not see the things visible in other directions.  
 
This is not a methodological choice specific to the study of German federalism. It is 
one example of the kind of ‘methodological nationalism’ that Jeffery and Wincott 
(2010) identified as limiting the ways in which political science understands regional 
                                                          
12 E.g. Marshall, T.H. (1992): ‘Citizenship and Social Class’, in Marshall, T.H. / Bottomore, Tom, Citizenship and 
Social Class (London: Pluto).  Rokkan, Stein (1999): State Formation, Nation-Building and Mass Politics in 
Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
13 Sturm, Roland (1999b), ‘Der Föderalismus im Wandel. Kontinuitätslinien und Reformbedarf’, in Jesse, 
Eckhard / Löw, Konrad (Eds.), 50 Jahre Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1999),, pp. 81-
99, here p. 85. 
14 Selmer, Peter (2009): ‚Folgen der neuen Abweichungsgesetzgebung der Länder – Abschied vom Leitbild 
‚gleichwertige Lebensverhältnisse‘?‘, in: Baus, Ralf Thomas / Scheller, Henrik / Hrbek, Rudolf (Eds.), Der 
deutsche Föderalismus 2020 (Baden-Baden: Nomos), pp. 46-56. 
15 Schmid, Josef (2010): ‚Die (mangelnde) Interdependenz in der Arbeitsmarkt- und Sozialpolitik im deutschen 
Föderalismus – von der Unitarisierung zur Balkanisierung‘, in: Oberhofer, Julia / Sturm, Roland (Eds.) (2010): 
Koalitionsregierungen in den Ländern und Parteienwettbewerb (München: Allitera), pp. 65-82. 
16 Titz, Christoph / Leffers, Jochen (2010): ‘Bildungsgipfel-Dreikampf: Vertagen, verschleppen, vertrösten’, in 
Der Spiegel, 10th June 2010, available at http://www.spiegel.de/unispiegel/studium/0,1518,699962,00.html 
(accessed 1st Dec 2015). 
17 Spiegel (2011): ‘Kritik an Bundesländern: Schröder prangert mangelnden Kita-Ausbau an’, in Der Spiegel, 9th 
October 2011, available at http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,790763,00.html, accessed 1st 
December 2015. 
 
18 Wimmer, Andreas, / Glick Schiller, Nina (2002): ‘Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: Nation-State 
Building, Migration and the Social Sciences’, Global Networks,  Vol. 2 / 4, pp. 301-34, here p. 302. 
 
politics, especially within west European states.19 If, as for example Rokkan’s work 
has often been (mis)-read, the nation-state is the scale at which ‘progress’ like stable 
democracy and comprehensive welfare policies have been achieved, we may be 
tempted to think of the state as a whole and its central political institutions not just as 
a more important unit of analysis than others, but ‘better’ than others because they 
have delivered ‘progress’. Against that background a regional unit of analysis – such 
as a German Land – can easily be framed not just as less important, and so less 
worthy of study, but also a challenge to ‘progress’, at best, as Sturm put it, a problem 
to be overcome,20 at worst the location of a damaging ‘race to the bottom’.21 
Moreover, if a particular unit of analysis is seen as more important and ‘better’, it is 
likely to be the focal point for data collection so that it can be known better. Other 
units of analysis without these advantages will tend to remain less knowable and in 
that sense ‘hidden from view’ due to a lack of available data. 
 
We would, though, stress that these approaches – one focusing on the operation of 
the federal system as a whole, one of the individual Länder – can be complementary.  
Formal and informal arenas for joint decision-making in Germany (using the single, 
system-wide unit of analysis) remain necessary areas of consideration, as several 
contributions in this volume show (for instance, in the consideration of budgetary 
policy22 and prisons policy23).  But we contend that the ‘sixteen-unit’ perspective, 
taking the level of the individual Länder as its starting point, is essential in producing 
a more nuanced understanding of contemporary German politics. 
 
Towards a Regional Political Science in Germany? 
 
There is now ample evidence that regional-level politics in western Europe and 
beyond is really quite important; few would say as important as state-level politics 
but important nonetheless. There are now more regional-level political institutions 
now than, say, 40 years ago, they have far more policy responsibilities,24 produce a 
growing diversity of policy outcomes at regional level, and are often focal points for 
distinct patterns of voting behaviour and party competition. For some, this can be the 
source of a ‘race to the bottom’ with regions competing to attract inward investment 
by cutting back social policy and other supposed ‘burdens’ on business.25 A more 
optimistic scenario is that of a ‘race to the top’,26 in which regions act as ‘laboratories’ 
of innovation,27 with the innovative pioneers driving up standards, either prompting 
                                                          
19 Jeffery, Charlie & Wincott, Daniel (2010), 'The Challenge of Territorial Politics: Beyond Methodological 
Nationalism'. in Colin Hay (ed.), New Directions in Political Science: Responding to the Challenges of an 
Interdependent World. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 167-188. 
20 Sturm, ‘Der Föderalismus im Wandel’.  
21 Peterson, Paul E. (1995): The Price of Federalism (Washington: Brookings Institution). 
22 Heinz, ‘Co-ordination in budget policy’. 
23 Turner, Ed / Rowe, Carolyn (2016): ‘Let’s stick together? Explaining boundaries to territorial policy variation: 
the case of Germany’s prisons legislation’, in German Politics, 25/2, pp. XXX. 
24 Marks, Gary / Hooghe, Liesbet / Schakel, Arjan H (2008): “Patterns of Regional Authority”, in Regional and 
Federal Studies 18/2-3, pp. 167-81. 
25 Peterson, The Price of Federalism. 
26 Beer, Samuel H. (1998), ‘Welfare Reform: Revolution or Retrenchment?’, in: Publius: The Journal of 
Federalism, Vol. 28, pp. 9-15. 
27 Osborne, David (1988): Laboratories of Democracy (Boston: Harvard Business School Press).  
 
others to emulate those standards,28 or establishing alternative settings for (higher 
standards of) welfare protection, as is often claimed in Flanders, Quebec and 
Scotland.29 
 
Yet much of this work remains a niche preoccupation on the fringes of ‘mainstream’ 
political science with its emphasis on states, their national parliaments and 
governments and their relations with other states. Calls for the recognition of a 
‘regional political science’30 are not yet widely heard.  
 
Much the same can be said of German federalism and German political science – 
despite the existence and significance of work over the last thirty-plus years which 
has focused on innovation and difference in Länder politics31 and a welter of more 
recent work which has pinpointed Land-by-Land variations in parties and party 
systems,32 coalition formation,33 voting behaviour,34 parliamentarism,35 systems of 
government,36 models of democracy,37 and public policy outcomes.38 This more 
                                                          
28 E.g. on the US, Karch, Andrew (2007), Democratic Laboratories. Policy Diffusion among the American States 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press); on Canada, Harrison, Kathryn (2006) (Ed.): Racing to the bottom?  
Provincial Interdependence in the Canadian Federation (Vancouver: UBC Press); on Spain, Costa-Font, Joan / 
Rico, Ana (2006): ‘Devolution and the Interregional Inequalities in Health and Healthcare in Spain’, in Regional 
Studies, Vol. 40 / 8, pp. 875-887. 
29 Beland, Daniel / Lecours, Andre (2008), Nationalism and Social Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press); 
Keating, Michael (2009): ‘Social Citizenship, Solidarity and Welfare in Regionalized and Plurinational States’, in: 
Citizenship Studies, Vol. 13 / 5, pp. 501 - 513. 
30 Jeffery, Charlie / Schakel, Arjan H. (2013), ‘Editorial: Towards a Regional Political Science’, in Regional Studies 
47/3, pp. 299-302. 
31 Mintzel, Alf (1977): Geschichte der CSU. Ein Überblick (Opladen: Leske und Budrich); Schmidt, Manfred G 
(1980): CDU und SPD an der Regierung: Ein Vergleich ihrer Politik in den Ländern (Frankfurt: Campus).  Benz, 
Arthur (1985): Föderalismus als dynamisches System. Zentralisierung und Dezentralisierung im föderativen 
Staat (Opladen: Leske und Budrich). Schmid, Josef (1990): Die CDU. Organisationsstrukturen, Politiken und 
Funktionsweisen einer Partei im Föderalismus (Opladen: Leske & Budrich); Götz, Klaus (1992): 
Intergovernmental Relations and State Government Discretion: The Case of Science and Technology Policy in 
Germany (Baden-Baden: Nomos); Jeffery, Charlie (1999): ‘Party Politics and Territorial Representation in the 
Federal Republic of Germany', West European Politics, Vol. 22 / 2, pp. 130-66; Sturm, Roland (1999a): ‘Party 
Competition and the Federal System: The Lehmbruch Hypothesis Revisited’, in: Jeffery, Charlie (Ed.), Recasting 
German Federalism. The Legacies of Unification (London: Pinter), pp. 197-216. 
32 Jun, Uwe / Haas, Melanie / Niedermayer, Oskar (Eds.) (2008): Parteien und Parteiensysteme in den 
deutschen Ländern, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag. 
33 Oberhofer, Julia / Sturm, Roland (Eds.) (2010): Koalitionsregierungen in den Ländern und 
Parteienwettbewerb (München: Allitera). 
34 Hough, Daniel / Jeffery, Charlie (2003): 'Landtagswahlen: Bundestestwahlen oder Regionalwahlen', 
Zeitschrift fur Parlamentsfragen, Vol. 33 / 1, pp. 49-66; Völkl, Kerstin / Schnapp, Kai-Uwe / Holtmann, Everhard 
/ Gabriel, Oscar W. (Eds.) (2008): Wähler und Landtagswahlen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Baden-
Baden: Nomos. 
35 Reutter, Werner (2008): Föderalismus, Parlamentarismus und Demokratie (Opladen: Leske und Budrich). 
36 Leunig, Sven (2006): Die Regierungssysteme der deutschen Länder im Vergleich (Opladen: Verlag Barbara 
Budrich). 
37 Freitag, Markus / Vatter, Adrian (2008) (Eds.): Die Demokratien der deutschen Bundesländer: Politische 
Institutionen im Vergleich (Opladen: Barbara Budrich); 
recent work is a simple reflection of reality: after German unification in 1990 
Germany became more diverse. As Schmidt notes in his conclusion to this volume, 
there are important drivers for diversity amongst the Länder: radically different 
demographic features (for instance, in levels of population age, ethnic diversity, or 
crime rates), variations in the level of economic development, the extent to which 
certain public services are received, and differences in fiscal capacity.39  To that 
might be added, too, variation in important dimensions of public opinion.40  That 
diversity is in key respects institutionalised in the Länder, it drives differences from 
Land to Land in voting behaviour, party competition and government formation, and 
differently constituted governments respond in different ways to the different 
circumstances different Länder face. Of course, diversity in the German system is 
not limitless – as Schmidt also highlights in his conclusion, there are important 
institutional constraints upon diversity.  Moreover (as shown by Reus’ contribution to 
this volume), there may be diffusion of particular policy choices from one Land to 
another – so that individual Länder end up choosing the same policy, whether 
prompted by costs of variation, public resistance or being won over by another 
Land’s experience. 
 
We might add, too, that there are ebbs and flows in Germany’s appetite for policy 
diversity not only between different Länder (with prosperous, southern Länder likely 
to press for additional competencies than their counterparts, notably those in 
northern and eastern Germany), but also over time.  The establishment of the 
commission on the reform of German federalism in 2003 perhaps marked the high-
water mark of ambition for greater decentralisation, though the 2006 reforms 
resulting, after numerous twists and turns, from that commission’s work fell some 
way short of a comprehensive reallocation of compromises.41  In the years 
thereafter, as an interviewee for a previous study by two of the authors contended 
(Interview with Margaretha Sudhof, 9th November 2011), the Zeitgeist had turned, 
with, in particular, the global financial crisis leading to concern about public debt (and 
ultimately to restrictions upon the ability of Land governments to borrow agreed in 
the 2009 federalism reforms).  This changed Zeitgeist also led to a (modest) reversal 
of the 2006 decision to make Länder exclusively responsible for education policy, 
with the Basic Law being revised in December 2014, so that co-operation between 
the federal government and the Länder in higher education was once again 
possible.42  The refugee crisis being experienced at the time of writing (2015/6) has 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
38 Hildebrandt and Wolf, Die Politik der Bundesländer; Hildebrandt and Wolf, Politik in den Bundesländern; 
Turner, Ed (2011): Political Parties and Public Policy in the German Länder: When Parties Matter (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan).  
39 Schmidt, Manfred G (2016), ‘Conclusion: Policy Diversity in Germany’s Federalism’, German Politics 25/2, pp. 
XXX 
40 Roller, Edeltraud (2015), ‘Welfare State and Political Culture in Unified Germany’, German Politics 24/3, pp. 
292-316. 
41 Turner, Ed / Rowe, Carolyn, ‘“Party Servants, Ideologues or Regional Representatives? The German Länder 
and the Reform of Federalism”, West European Politics, (2013), 36/2, pp. 382-404 
42 Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung (2015), ‘Kooperation von Bund und Ländern in Wissenschaft 
und Bildung’, available at https://www.bmbf.de/de/kooperation-von-bund-und-laendern-in-wissenschaft-und-
bildung-77.html (last accessed 01.02.2016). 
also led to calls for the federal government to be given greater responsibility for 
policy.43   
 
Viewed against these ebbs and flows it may be most appropriate to summarise that 
German federalism is not, and arguably never has been, simply a complex system of 
coordination between different levels of government, but is also, and arguably 
always has been, a system which gives the Länder some capacity to respond to 
territorially distinctive views among their electorates and pursue distinctive policy 
priorities – both perspectives are indispensable in studying the whole. Yet the 
traditional narrative of uniformity continues to dominate today, even after the recent 
federalism reforms;44 that dominance risks disguising Germany’s territorial 
distinctiveness.  
 
Challenging the Uniformity Narrative 
 
The purpose of this special issue is both to test that narrative, and explore the extent 
to which it can be complemented with an analysis focused at the level of the 
individual Länder. The contributions address three kinds of question. The first 
concerns the extent to which the German federal system, as well as a locus of policy 
entanglement in statewide policy-making, is also a locus for distinctive policies in the 
German Länder. We do not reject the view that Germany has a highly integrated 
federal system. But we do suggest that this is an incomplete view of the German 
federal system. There is substantial evidence over decades of significant territorial 
policy variation between the Länder, for example in regional economic policy,45 or, as 
Schmidt showed in his seminal study of whether parties ‘make a difference’, because 
different election victors choose to do different things with the policy levers at their 
disposal,46 or as the more recent collection assembled by Wolf and Hildebrandt has 
shown, because different Länder have different structural characteristics and 
respond to issues differently.47 So how much difference and diversity has there been 
alongside the conventional picture of integration and uniformity? 
Second, there have been substantial recent reforms in 2006 and 2009. So what 
impact have they had on territorial policy variation in the Länder? The 2006 reforms 
awarded the Länder a range of new exclusive powers and opened up in some areas 
the right of the Länder to deviate from federal legislative standards. These changes 
in principle – and as some small case studies have shown already in practice – open 
                                                          
43 Mitteldeutsche Zeitung (2015), ‘Die Fehler des Föderalismus’, 23rd September 2015, Mitteldeutsche Zeitung, 
available at http://www.mz-web.de/politik/kommentar-zur-fluechtlingskrise-die-fehler-des-foederalismus-
22777546 (last accessed 01.02.2016). 
44 Burkhart, Simone (2008): Blockierte Politik. Ursachen und Folgen von ‚Divided Government‘ in Deutschland 
(Frankfurt: Campus); Scheller, Henrik / Schmid, Josef (Eds.) (2008): Föderale Politikgestaltung im deutschen 
Bundesstaat. Variable Verflechtungsmuster in Politikfeldern (Baden-Baden: Nomos); Scharpf, Fritz W. (2009): 
Föderalismusreform. Kein Ausweg aus der Politikverflechtungsfalle? (Frankfurt: Campus). 
45 Sturm, Roland (1989), ‘The Industrial Policy Debate in the Federal Republic of Germany’, in: Bulmer, Simon 
(Ed.): The Changing Agenda of West German Public Policy (Aldershot: Gower), pp.. 155-174; Götz, Klaus (1992): 
Intergovernmental Relations and State Government Discretion: The Case of Science and Technology Policy in 
Germany (Baden-Baden: Nomos) 
46 Schmidt, CDU und SPD an der Regierung. 
47 Hildebrandt and Wolf, Die Politik der Bundesländer, pp. 363-6. 
up further scope for distinctive Länder policies.48 However, the fiscal constraints 
agreed in the 2009 reforms may have a dampening effect on policy autonomy by 
reducing the budgetary room for manoeuvre of the Länder, and seeing a levelling-
down of service provision. So what is the overall effect? 
Third, if we recognise patterns of variation in both longer and shorter terms, what are 
their systemic implications? If the Länder are racing anywhere, is it to the bottom or 
the top in terms of standards? Or is their capacity to ‘race’ in any direction still limited 
by institutional constraints imposed by the formal structure of the federal system, by 
continuing integrative roles played by political parties, or by public opinion - widely 
understood as suspicious of policy variation.49 To put this a different way, do features 
of the federal system that promote statewide uniformity stand in tension with those 
promoting Land-level diversity in some kind of zero-sum relationship? Or are there 
two ‘faces’ of German federalism in which practices favouring uniformity are pursued 
in some fields and are complemented by practices favouring diversity in others?50   
The contribution by Jeffery and Pamphilis address these questions head on by 
presenting data on policy outcomes which show that, at least for the last 20 years, 
uniformity of policy outcomes have not been achieved, alongside what they describe 
as ‘paradoxical’ public attitudes on policy variation: citizens appear to want their 
Länder to have greater policy responsibilities – but not to use them to pursue 
diversity of policy outcomes.51 In this sense citizens themselves may enact distinct 
‘faces’ of German federalism. 
 
The clearest indication as to the shape of contemporary German federalism can be 
found through direct analysis of decision making and the ability of multiple tiers of 
governmental authority to shape policies. To that end, this Special Issue draws 
together sets of analyses of the initial impact of the 2006 and 2009 reforms to the 
                                                          
48 Kinzig, Jörg / Steinhilber, Benjamin (2008): ‘Der Strafvollzug in der Hand der Bundesländer’, in: Europäisches 
Zentrum für Föderalismus-Forschung (Ed.): Jahrbuch des Föderalismus 2008 (Baden-Baden: Nomos) pp. 188-
203; Rahm, Christian (2008): ‘Die Umsetzung der Föderalismusreform I am Beispiel des öffentlichen 
Wohnungsrechts in Bayern’, in: Europäisches Zentrum für Föderalismus-Forschung (Ed.): Jahrbuch des 
Föderalismus 2008 (Baden-Baden: Nomos) pp. 204-215; Haug, Volker (2010): ‘Besser als ihr Ruf – die 
Föderalismusfreform I im Hochschulbereich’, in: Europäisches Zentrum für Föderalismus-Forschung (Ed.): 
Jahrbuch des Föderalismus 2010 (Baden-Baden: Nomos) pp.176-87; Münch, Ursula (2010): ‘Föderale und 
parteipolitische Interdependenzen bei schulpolitischen Innovationsprozessen‘, in: Europäisches Zentrum für 
Föderalismus-Forschung (Ed.): Jahrbuch des Föderalismus 2010 (Baden-Baden: Nomos), pp. 188-99; Hoymann, 
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allocation of competence within the federal system. The contribution by Hildebrandt 
and Wolf takes issue with the expectation of “racing” dynamics within the new 
architecture of German federalism. The authors focus on two key areas of policy 
which were central to the reform negotiations: higher education policy and 
environmental policy. The shift in competences post 2006/9 are assessed here in the 
context of expectations of intensified policy competition. Their findings are illustrative 
of the enduring strength of the state-wide political culture in these particular policy 
fields, with its embedded preferences for state-wide policy outcomes and normative 
dislike of variation. This, the authors argue, supports an interpretation of the German 
federal system simply as a ‘dynamic federalism’, where incremental changes are 
commonplace, iterative and constant in the federation’s history.52 
 
Reus, in her investigation of the legislation at Land level on smoking bans in public 
places, suggests that potential scope for divergence in policy-making at the Land 
level was not realised – owing primarily to the development of a state-wide public 
preference for full scale bans on smoking alongside demand for uniformity. This led 
to the striking uniformity of outcome which we see, despite initial political approaches 
to drafting differential legislation in line with particular ideological positioning on the 
issue.  The key differences which have emerged are to be found in the details of that 
regulation, as Reus explains. Reus also makes the important point that public 
opinion and Germany’s media (perhaps in a symbiotic relationship) may also 
individual Länder away from the path of radical policy variation towards similar 
choices.53  
 
Turner and Rowe examine the area of prisons policy, which was passed to the 
Länder in the 2006 reforms.54  It was a politically contentious area, with the many 
opponents of the change (particularly numerous amongst academics, practitioners 
and specialists in the political parties) fearful of a ‘competition of harshness’, as well 
as arbitrary and damaging policy incoherence.  The picture which emerges is of no 
such ‘race to the bottom’, with relatively modest differentiation in some Länder, 
driven often by party priorities and to some degree by features of the territory in 
question.  Moreover, the Länder displayed vastly different levels of interest in 
revisiting previous, federal laws, with those who had pressed for reform (such as 
Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg) rushing to legislate, and others showing no such 
appetite for variation.  Nonetheless, Turner and Rowe also point to long-standing 
variations the implementation of prisons policy, predating the 2006 reform and their 
acquisition of legislative competence.  Thus, a focus on politics below the national 
level remains important in this area. 
 
In his analysis of the multi-level coordination of budget policy in Germany, Heinz 
takes further this investigation into the potential for divergent Land-level approaches 
to policy making, versus the reality of how the new powers afforded to the Länder by 
the 2006/9 reform have in fact played out.55 Heinz concludes that shared expertise 
encouraged the Länder to develop a common mechanism on crisis avoidance, but 
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that at the level of individual budgetary policy-making, the Länder have continued to 
diverge in their legislative approaches.  
 
Shifts at the level of the political system are also core to our understanding of the 
new German federalism that is emerging in the wake of the 2006/9 reforms. Two 
contributions to this Special Issue take forward an analysis of how a new federal  
system of governance has implications for real politics in action, namely party 
competition and voter behaviour. In his contribution, Klaus Detterbeck illustrates how 
party politics has been reshaped by the federal reforms’ creation of new arenas for 
autonomous Länder policy making. At an organisational level, we would expect there 
to be some demonstrable impact on the parties themselves following the shift in the 
locus of policy-making. What Detterbeck forcefully demonstrates here, however, is 
the deep-rooted inertia within the party organisations themselves.  This has 
effectively hamstrung the development of new organisational models which could 
and would adapt to the new opportunities for policy-shaping which the federal 
reforms have opened up.56 
 
In her analysis of voter behaviour at the Land and the federal level, Kerstin Völkl also 
powerfully makes the case for a narrative of German federalism that sees the 2006/9 
reform not as a hiatus, but rather as a marker of political intent.57 The tangible impact 
of the federal reforms is, at the level of voter choice, marginal. Instead, we find that 
federal considerations do tend to impact upon voter choice, but there are variations 
in the extent to which they matter, depending in particular in which parties are in 
government at the federal, and the Land, level. 
 
Overall, then, the conclusion of this special issue points to a substantial degree of 
nuance, a theme taken up by Manfred G. Schmidt in the conclusion to this volume.58 
Schmidt’s contribution highlights the areas where increasing policy diversity can be 
found in the German federal system, but through analysis of areas where an 
increase in policy convergence – that is, decreasing policy variation - can be 
identified, seeks to identify the key factors which can determine these policy 
developments. 
 
What this volume shows is that those who anticipated that the federalism reforms of 
2006 and 2009, as well as Germany’s growing inequalities, would lead to an 
American-style competitive federalism being ‘let rip’, with a vast divergence in 
policies between the Länder, will be disappointed.  In some areas, modest pressures 
for increased divergence can be discerned, but a normative commitment to co-
ordination and a broad similarity of policies across the territory can be discerned.  
Similarly, the party system has not been ‘regionalised’, although the changed 
circumstances of the German polity can certainly be discerned there, and Land-level 
elections remain influenced by the national context.  However, variations between 
the Länder most certainly exist – as they always have done – in their policies as well 
as their political institutions, and an understanding of German federalism simply as 
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being a process of national co-ordination, with the Länder just as administrative 
units, while never being persuasive is now, most certainly, outmoded.  Germany’s 
federal system clearly remains in flux, and (at the very latest after negotiations on 
fiscal federalism at the end of this decade) the questions addressed in this volume 
will need to be kept under close review. 
  
 
 
